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18 December 1946

MEMORANDUM

TO: O.I.C.
THRU: G.I.D.
FROM: V.T.C.
SUBJECT: ~~V~~etting Directive.

1. In line with the dissolution of SSU and the incorporation of the body of FSRO into the CIG, it is recommended that new directives be issued on the subject of vetting. Proposed drafts for new vetting directives have been prepared by the VTO and are submitted herewith for consideration. One is intended for "q. and field distribution, the other for headquarters distribution only. The overall effect of the proposals incorporated herein is to provide a single office within OSO where all vetting activities are coordinated, and where completely objective appreciations of the security values of operations can be reached. The two main points of this effect are worth further consideration.

2. It must be recognized that if the responsibility for the security review of operations is decentralized, it will ultimately fall on the Division heads, each one reviewing the vetting of agents in his own area. This will inevitably result in a varied interpretation of the needs for vetting investigation, and of the extent to which agents are weighed before being put to use. Centralized vetting review, on the other hand, will provide a consistent means of direction of vetting inquiry, and a consistent interpretation of security values. It will further provide a force for coordination of those operations which cross area lines. In past instances, considerable operational effort has been wasted due to this lack of a proper coordinating force.

3. It is not realistic to expect that persons whose primary responsibility is the handling or servicing of operations can always make an objective evaluation of the security aspects of their own operations. They are driven by operational necessity to produce intelligence; security is a factor which tends to diminish the flow of raw intelligence, and as such is too easily disregarded by the operations-man. Further, Operations are the product of the planning of case officers and operations desk personnel, and too often they are temperamentally unable to realize insecure aspects in their own operations until it is too late. This is not a reflection

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-2-

on individuals, but rather is a recognition of an all too human characteristic. Similar characteristics are recognized in the provision of objective evaluations by the Security Office of prospective staff personnel, and of objective grading by the Source Control Branch of the intelligence product of the various sources of information. It should be no less important to assure that the security of overseas operations be the subject of objective study as abstract problems by persons with no direct personal concern in the success or failure of the operations.

4. A brief consideration of the significant provisions of the proposals follows, giving their aims and purposes.

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Page Denied

Next 10 Page(s) In Document Denied